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CASENOTE
Can You Say "N"?:
NIMBY, NWPA and Nuclear Preemption
Nevada v. Watkins,
914 F2d 1545 (9th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1105(1991)

INTRODUCTION
The sense of the whole people, most gracious sovereign, never
ought to be condemned by wise and beneficent rulers; whatever may
be the abstract claims or even rights of the supreme power. We have
been too early instructedand too long inhabituatedto believe, that the
only firm seat of all authority is in the minds, affections and interest
of the people ....
1
Federal regulation of nuclear energy began in 1946, with the passage of Atomic Energy Act. 2 With the use of nuclear energy came the
responsibility and necessity of safe disposal of nuclear waste.3 Congress
has been unable or unwilling to effectively deal with the issue of nuclear
waste disposal. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) was enacted in
1982 to deal with this issue by creating a plan to develop nuclear-waste
disposal sites. 4 The critical question was where would these sites be
located? The 1987 amendments to the NWPA answered that question by
naming Yucca Mountain as the sole site for a high-level waste (HLW)

1. C, Friedrich, Man and His Government 227 (1963) (quoting E. Burke), reprinted in L.
Lake, Environmental Regulation: The Political Effects of Implementation 26 (1982).
2. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585,60 Stat. 755, superseded by Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.§§ 2011-2017
(1988)).
3. Spent nuclearfuel is "fuel that has been withdrawn from a nuclear reaction following
irradiation ..."42 U.S.C. § 10101 (23) (1989). High-level waste is "highly radioactive material
resulting from the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel ....Id. § 10101 (12) (A).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101-10270 (1989)[hereinafter NWPA].
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repository.5 The site characterization 6 of only one site, Yucca Mountain,
has raised new concerns about a state's ability to regulate nuclear waste
7
disposal within its boundaries.

In Nevada v. Watkins, 8 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
the constitutionality of the 1987 NWPA amendments, which enabled the
continued site characterization of Yucca Mountain and thwarted Nevada's attempt to ban nuclear waste within its borders.9 The Watkins court

ruled that Nevada's statute, which banned nuclear waste, was preempted
by NWPA. Nevada, like many states, has passed laws that limit the storage, transportation or disposal of nuclear waste within its state boundaries. 10 These statutes will meet the same fate as the one struck down in
the Watkins decision-that is, until states rights in the area of nuclear

energy are clarified.
This note examines Watkins' application of the preemption doctrine, as well as general preemption principles, to determine what ave-

nues may still be open to states seeking to regulate the disposal of nuclear
waste. The Watkins decision neither discussed the full authority of NWPA
nor defined the extent of the federal government's preemption of state
regulation of nuclear waste disposal. However, Watkins seems to solidify
the rationale of other recent court decisions holdings that Congress has
occupied the nuclear-energy field.
This interpretation could effectively eliminate any state regulatory power over the nuclear-energy field, including nuclear-waste disposal. States with a large percentage of federal public land, such as
Nevada, understandably may be puzzled by the courts' interpretation of

the federal preemption doctrine when drafting state environmental laws.
For example, in applying the doctrine of federal preemption, courts have
5. On December 22,1987, Congress amended the NWPA, designating Yucca Mountain as
the sole site. 42 U.S.C. § 10172 (1989).
6. Site characterizationis defined as: (A) siting research activities with respect to a test and
evaluation facility at a candidate site; and (B) activities whether in the laboratory of in the
field, undertaken to establish the geologic condition and the ranges of the parameters of a
candidate site relevant to the location of a repository, including borings, surface excavations,
excavations of exploratory shafts, limited subsurface lateral excavations and borings, and in
situ testing needed to evaluate the suitability of a candidate site for the location of a repository, but not including preliminary borings and geophysical testing needed to assess whether
site characterization should be undertaken. 42 U.S.C. § 10101(21) (1989).
7. It is not surprising that Yucca Mountain was selected as the sole site for site characterization. "Politically, the Nevada Test Site (Yucca Mountain) may be an ideal location for a
repository: it is federally owned and dedicated to nuclear uses .... R. Lipschutz, Radioactive Waste: Politics, Technology and Risk 143 (1980).
8. 914 F.2d 1545 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1105 (1991).
9. Watkins, 914 F.2d at 1560-61.
10. Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Utah authorize state and private ownership of
hazardous waste disposal sites. Ga. Code Ann. § 12-8-103 (Michie 1982); Md. Nat. Res. Code
Ann. § 3-711 (1983); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 21D, § 17 (Law Co-op. 1981); Utah Code Ann.
§ 26-14b-6 (Supp. 1982).
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held that states have some authority over federal public lands within their
boundaries,1 1 but when an aspect of nuclear energy is12involved, the courts
apply the doctrine of federal preemption differently.
Presently, it appears that states do have some authority to regulate concerns in the nuclear field, but courts may find a congressional
intent to occupy the entire field of nuclear energy. Whether states can exercise any of their police powers without being preempted by NWPAi 3 is
another unanswered question. This unanswered question should prompt
Congress and not the courts to define clearly what authority states have in
regulating activities dealing with nuclear energy.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On May 27, 1986, the Department of Energy (DOE) nominated
five HLW sites. 4 However, Congress amended NWPA on December 22,
1987, and designated 15Yucca Mountain as the sole site for characterization
as a HLW repository.
In accordance with Nevada law, the Energy Secretary applied for
state environmental permits. During the application period, the Nevada
Legislature passed two resolutions that were transmitted to the President and both houses of Congress in April 1989. On June 22, 1989, Nevada's governor signed into law Assembly Bill 222, which states that "it is
unlawful for any person or governmental entity to store high-level radioactive waste in Nevada." 17 Congress did not respond to Nevada's actions.
The two parties had opposite opinions as to the legality of continued characterization of Yucca Mountain. Unable to resolve this conflict,
Nevada filed suit in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The State of
Nevada brought a petition to review the Energy Secretary's decision, mak11. California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572 (1987).
12. When dealing with nuclear energy, courts will look at a state law's "actual effect on
nuclear safety." English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 80 (1990).
13. Notwithstanding preemption, the statute may face yet another challenge-the Commerce Clause. Just how the Commerce Clause would affect Nevada's statutes was not discussed in Watkins.
14. This was done according to 51 Fed. Reg. 19783-84 (1986). The five sites were located in
Mississippi, Nevada, Texas, Utah, and Washington.
15. Congress left intact Nevada's right to submit a notice of disapproval. See Nuclear
Waste Policy Act of 1987,42 U.S.C.§§ 10133-10136,10172, amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101-10270
(1989).
16. Assembly Joint Resolution 4, passed on January 17, 1989, expresses Nevada's "adamant opposition to the placement of a high-level nuclear repository." Assembly Joint Resolution 6, passed on January 23,1989, prohibited repositories at Yucca Mountain "without the
prior consent of the Nevada Legislature or a cession of jurisdiction" according to Chapter 328
of the Nevada Revised Statutes. Nevada attempted to avoid preemption by placing economic
and environmental concerns within this resolution.
17. Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 459-910 (1989).
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ing Nevada suitable for characterization. 18 The Ninth Circuit ruled that
the federal government's plenary power under the Property Clause validates the 1987 NWPA amendments. The State of Nevada appealed this
decision to the Supreme Court, but certiorari was denied. 19 Litigation continues as Nevada attempts to use its environmental
permits to control the
2°
site characterization of Yucca Mountain.

BACKGROUND
The Path to Yucca Mountain
The federal government had been in search of a HLW repository
for more than two decades, a search that has cost the taxpayers billions of
dollars.2 1 The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA) was enacted in an
effort to address nuclear waste disposal. NWPA provides that the Energy
Secretary must issue guidelines to serve as the basic criteria for the nomination of five sites suitable for "site characterization." 22 Further, the
Energy Secretary is required toperform a detailed environmental assessment for each nominated site.2 3 This process signaled the beginning of a
battle riddled with the use of the NIMBY (not in my backyard) mentality.
The Secretary originally nominated nine sites in six states: Louisiana, Mississippi, Nevada, Texas, Utah and Washington. 24 Congressional
debate heightened when on May 28, 1986, President Reagan announced
that Nevada, Texas, and Washington would be investigated as possible
sites for nuclear-waste repositories and Energy Secretary Herrington
announced a second repository site would not be investigated, contrary to
NWPA requirements. 25 This caused quite some concern in Congress.
Although it was first believed that the DOE program could not be
implemented without substantial changes to NWPA, Congress approved
the 1987 amendments to NWPA. What happened? Senator Johnston,
Chairman of the Senate Energy Committee, proposed an amendment to
NWPA that would provide financial incentives to a State willing to accept
a repository and waive the right to judicial review and State veto. 26 In
18. The court assumed jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C § 10139(a)(1) (1989), which gives the
Court of Appeals original jurisdiction over the Energy Secretary's final decision.
19. 111 S.Ct. 1105 (1991).
20. L. Greenberger, 1992 NARUC Winter Meetings; Nuclear: A Focus on Waste, Public Utilities FORTNIGHTLY, Apr. 15, 1992, Vol. 129 No. 8 Special Report at 35, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, OMNI File.
21, See 133 Cong. Rec 16415 (1987) (statement of Sen. McClure). In 1984, DOE estimated
that over the next 50 years the total program cost will be at least $20.9 billion.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 10132 (b) (1989).
23. Id. § 10132 (b) (D).
24. 49 Fed. Reg. 49, 540-41 (1984).
25. DOE Decision to Halt Second Repository Program Could Derail Entire Waste Act, NuclearFuel, June 2,1986, at 7, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 10173-101739 (a) (1989).
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response, sponsors from both political parties introduced commissionmoratorium bills that blocked Johnston's bill. 7 To counter this legislation,
Johnston proposed to prohibit any second-round siting activities for 20
years, to annul and revoke the DOE decision to site a Monitored Retrievable Storage (MRS) facility in Tennessee, and to delay choosing new sites
until 1989. The Senate Energy Commission passed Senate Bill 1668 and
attached it to the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Bill (the federal deficit
reduction bill) and the continuing resolution to appropriate monies to
fund the federal government's 1988 operations. 28 Representatives from
Washington, Texas, Tennessee, and nearby states affected by the MRS,
compromised their positions. Because of these compromises, Johnston's
bill passed and only the Nevada site would be characterized as a nuclear
waste repository.2 9 Nevada's political strength in the decision to be the
host state for a high-level waste repository was questioned. 30 Having lost
its battle in Congress, Nevada turned to the courts.

DISCUSSION
31

The attorneys for the State of Nevada raised numerous issues.
The most decisive issue presented was whether Congress had the constitutional authority to enact the 1987 NWPA amendments via the Property
Clause of the United States Constitution.3 2 The court declared that the
Property Clause validated Congress' authority to amend NWPA, and did
not consider the Secretary's other arguments. 33 Looking at Congress' constitutional authority to enact the amendments, the court only examined
the Property Clause. 34 The Supreme Court has established that "Congress
27. S. 839, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
28. Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329 (1987); Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330 (1987).
29. On December 22,1987, Congress amended NWPA. The amendments designated Yucca
Mountain as the sole site to be characterized. 42 U.S.C. § 10172 (1989).

30. "Nevada is being targeted [for a radioactive waste repository] without any pretense
whatsoever of a scientific basis for the decision. The House Democratic leadership decided
to pull a blatant political power play, and unfortunately it worked." 203 Cong. Rec. 518,543
(daily ed. Dec. 19,1987) (statement of Sen. Hecht).
31. The court also examined numerous other constitutional arguments: the Federal
Enclave Clause, the Equal Footing Doctrine, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Port
Preference Clause and Nevada's contention that the Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress'
ability to enact the Amendments. See 914 F.2d at 1554-58.
32. Nevada claimed Congress did not have the constitutional authority to enact the 1987
amendments to NWPA because the Property Clause is not enumerated in Article I. Watkins,
914 F.2d at 1553.
33. The Secretary stated that Congress is authorized by the Property Clause, U.S. Const.
art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; the Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. art. I § 8, cl. 3; and the Common Defense
Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Watkins, 914 F.2d at 1552.
34. "The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States." U.S. Const.
art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
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exercises thepowers both of a proprietor and of a legislature over the public domain." 35 The court stated that Nevada's argument 36 is "contrary to
well-settled Supreme Court precedent establishing the broad power
granted to the government in the property clause to regulate federal
lands." 37

Nevada unsuccessfully argued case law that only applied to state
38
owned lands and not federal-owned lands such as Yucca Mountain.
Although the court noted that the Supreme Court ruled that the federal
government "'has occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns,
except the limited powers expressly ceded to the states,'" 3 9 it did not

explain what those limited powers were. Thus, the Watkins court left open
this question: what authority do states possess in regulating nuclearwaste disposal within their state boundaries?

ANALYSIS
While the Property Clause gives Congress plenarypower to con-

trol the use of federal public lands such as Yucca Mountain,40 the question
remains as to whether NWPA would preempt any statute that Nevada
crafted to deal with nuclear-waste disposal within its boundaries. To discuss this question, the doctrine of preemption, the court's preemption
analysis of Nevada's attempted legislative veto of site characterization,

and what alternatives are available to states when attempting to enforce
state laws dealing with nuclear-waste disposal, will be examined.

35. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529,540 (1976).
36. Nevada's argument was similar to the contention presented in United States v. Vogler,
859 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989). In Vogler, a miner wishing to mine
in a national park, contended that the federal government could only regulate state land to
further one of its enumerated powers and the federal government had no power to enforce a
federal access permit requirement. See Watkins, 914 F.2d at 1553 (citing United States v. Vogler,
859 F2d at 640-41).
37. Vogler also held that it is not necessary that Congress act pursuant to an enumerated
power. Vogler, 859 F.2d at 640-41.
38. Nevada also relied on Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907). However, this case did
not deal with the regulation of federal land. Rather, it involved the United States' attempt to
enforce the Reclamation Act by intervening in a suit between Kansas and Colorado over the
flow of the Arkansas River into state-owned river beds. The court ruled the Property Clause
was "limited to authority over the property belonging to the United States within [the States']
limits."
39. Watkins, 914 F.2d at 1560 (quoting English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 70,79 (1990)) (additional cites omitted).
40, See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976); California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite
Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572 (1987).
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The Preemption Doctrine
The Watkins court, following the steps of the Supreme Court,
applied the traditional preemption analysis to Nevada's statute. The
Supreme Court begins preemption analysis by assuming "that the historic
police powers of the States are not to be superseded by the Federal Act
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." 4 1 Moreover,
"Itihe exercise of federal supremacy is not lightly to be presumed." 42
State law can be preempted, generally, in two ways. One way is if
Congress shows an express or implied intent to occupy a given field, any
state law falling within that occupied field is preempted. 43 State law also
may be preempted even if Congress has not entirely "occupied the field"
in question, if the state law conflicts with federal law. An actual conflict
44
exists if it is "impossible to comply with both the state and federal law"
to the accomplishment of the full
or if the "state law stands as an obstacle
45
purpose and objectives of Congress."
The Supreme Court has readily preempted state laws in areas that
are: 1) traditionally regulated by the federal government, 2) governed by a
pervasive federal regulatory scheme, or 3) areas where national uniformity in regulation is critical.4 6 These areas47include the regulation of labor,
navigation, immigration, and civil rights.
The Watkins Application of Preemption Analysis
The Watkins court, finding that NWPA did not expressly preempt
Nevada's statute, 48 proceeded to examine whether NWPA or the Atomic
Energy Act (AEA) occupied the field of nuclear-waste disposal. The Watkins court, looking at Supreme Court precedent, declined to decide
whether Nevada's statute was preempted because Congress "'occupield]
the field' of nuclear waste disposal." 49 The court, however, did rule that
Nevada's statute "'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress."' 50 and was preempted by an
implied conflict with NWPA. The court stated that "Congress clearly
41. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (cites omitted).
42. New York State Dep't of Social Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973) (quoting
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 203 (1952)).
43. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461
U.S. 190,203-204 (1983).
44. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
45. California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. at 581 (cites omitted).
46. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 479-81 (2d ed. 1988).
47. G. Coggins & C. Wilkinson, Federal Public Land and Resources Law 210 (1989).
48. Nevada argued that its statute together with its assembly joint resolutions were a legislative veto of the characterization of Yucca Mountain. The Secretary countered with the
argument that NWPA preempts the Nevada statute. Neither party contended that Congress
had expressly preempted the field of nuclear waste disposal. Watkins, 914 F.2d at 1560.
49. Id. at 1561.
50. Id. at 1561 (quoting Granite Rock, 480 U.S. at 581) (additional cites omitted).
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directed the Secretary to continue site characterization activities at Yucca
Mountain. ...

"51

Nevada relied on Pacific Gas & Elec. v: State Energy

Resources & Dev. Comm'n 52 in unsuccessfully attempt to couch the statute
as being based on economic and environmental concerns and, thus, within
the realm of state police powers. The Watkins court, by citing the Supreme
Court ruling in English v. General Elec. Co., 53 noted the clarification of
Pacific Gas.54In English the Court ruled that "[while] part of the preempted
field is defined by reference to the purpose of the state law in question,
another part of the field is defined by the state law's actual effect on
nuclear safety."55 The court held that the statute was preempted by
NWPA because56 Nevada's statute had the "actual effect of frustrating Congress' intent."
The Watkins court application of traditional preemption analysis
is correct in this case. The court's analysis concludes that in the area of
nuclear waste disposal, a state law's effect and purpose will be balanced to
determine if the state law is preempted by a federal act. In this instance,
effect outweighed purpose, and Nevada's statute was preempted by
NWPA. The Watkins decision also supports the rationale that the focus of
preemption is on the area to be regulated.

What Now Nevada?
What authority do states have in enforcing the state regulation of
nuclear waste disposal without being subject to federal preemption?
NWPA does contain provisions for state participation in the regulation of
activities at Yucca Mountain, a right to file a notice of disapproval, 57 a
right to access information during the characterization process, 58 and a
right to enter into benefits agreement. 59 However, it should be noted that
these rights have no effect until after DOE's characterization of Yucca
Mountain. Looking at case precedent, states may find a way to avoid
being preempted. Many states have enacted legislation in the interest of
economics, public health and safety which interfere with the federal government's activities in nuclear development. 60 However, where that legislation conflicts with federal law, the Supremacy Clause nullifies the
conflicting state legislation. 6 1 An examination of federal nuclear regula51. Id.

52.
53.
54,
55,
56.
57.
58.

461 U.S. 190 (1983).
496 U.S. 72 (1990).
Watkins, 941 F.2d at 1561 (quoting English v. General Elec. Co, 496 U.S. at 80).
English, 496 U.S. at 80.
Watkins, 941 F.2d at 1561.
42 U.S.C. § 10165 (1989).
Id. § 10134 (a).

59. Id. § 10173.
60. For one such example, see Washington State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983).
61. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl.2.
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tion and two cases in the area of nuclear preemption may be useful in
determining what action states should take in order to avoid preemption.
Federal Nuclear Regulation
Federal regulatory authority over nuclear matters is defined in
the Atomic Energy Act of 1946,62 the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,63
amended by the Energy Reorganization Act,64 the Department of Energy
Organization Act of 1977,65 and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1987.
Through these various laws and the creation of DOE and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the federal government has sought control in the
nuclear energy.
After the end of World War II, Congress, via the Atomic Energy
Act of 1946, gave the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) exclusive control
over the regulation of activities dealing with high-level waste. Amendments to this act allowed the private sector to participate in the nuclear
arena. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 did not specifically mention nuclear
waste, but the regulatory authority of the AEC encompasses the aspect of
nuclear energy.6 However, this legislation inadequately dealt with the
issue of nuclear waste management. NWPA was enacted in 1982, to deal
with this problem and created a plan to implement federal nuclear-waste
management policy. This specifically involved the location and the development of nuclear waste disposal sites. The purposes of NWPA are to 1)
establish a schedule for the siting, construction, and operation of repositories;67 2) establish federal responsibility for nuclear waste disposal;68 3)
define the federal-state relationship with respect to nuclear waste dis-

62. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, 60 Stat. 755, superseded by Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703,68 Stat. 919 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C,§§ 20112017 (1988)).
63. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954,42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296.
64. The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974,42 U.S.C. §§ 5801 (1974), phased out the AEC.
To assume the duties of the AEC, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) was created.
The NRC was assigned AEC's regulatory and licensing powers. The Energy Research and
Development Administration (ERDA) dealt with AEC's function under the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954. NRC and ERDA were to cooperate in the development of safety standards for
the protection of high-level wastes from "threats, thefts and sabotage." 42 U.S.C. §§
5844(b)(2)(B) (1989).
65. The Department of Energy (DOE) was created by Congress in 1977 as successor to
ERDA. Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7133 (a) (8), 7151 (a) (1988). DOE
was assigned specific duties in the area of nuclear waste management, but DOE is prevented
from impinging on the waste management regulatory power held by the NRC. 42 U.S.C. §
7133 (a) (8) (1989).
66. See Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd mem.,
405 U.S. 1035 (1972). This case was statutorily overruled by the 1977 Clean Air Act amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 7420 (1977).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 10131 (b) (1) (1989).
68. Id. § 10131 (b)(2).
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Waste Fund to cover the costs of the
posal;69 and 4) establish a Nuclear
70
disposal of radioactive wastes.
Preemption Cases
The first case to deal with the question of nuclear preemption was
Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota. 1 The issue in Northern States was
whether the federal government had sole authority in the regulation of
radioactive-waste emissions from a commercially owned power plant that
the AEC licensed. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals examined the
validity of the Minnesota regulations (the granting of waste-disposal permits) which were more restrictive than those imposed by the federal government. The court ruled that the Minnesota regulations were preempted
on several grounds: 1) that although the Atomic Energy Act did not
expressly grant the federal government exclusive authority in the nuclear
arena, the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, and the 1956 and 1959 amendments,
illustrated that Congress intended to preempt the field, including the
authority to repulate radioactive emissions from commercial nuclear
power plants; 7 2) that there was "[no] room for the exercise of dual or
concurrent jurisdiction by States to control radiation hazards by regulations byproduct, source, or special nuclear materials . . ."73; 3) that the
there was an implied intent to preempt state law based on the "pervasiveness of the federal regulatory scheme," 74 the "nature of the subject matter
regulated and the need for uniform controls in order to effectuate the
objectives of Congress .... 75
The Watkins court seemed to use this rationale to preempt Nevada's legislation. Alternatively, the application of Northern States could
have been narrowed, as it was done in Pacific Gas.7 6 This case dealt with
whether the Atomic Energy Act preempted California's Warren-Alquist
Act,77 which sought to ban certification of new nuclear power plants in
the States. The Supreme Court finding the Warren-Alquist Act valid,
stated "the federal government maintains complete control of the safety
and 'nuclear' aspects of energy generation" 7° while the States retain
authority in non-nuclear areas such as economic-risk assessment. 79 Under
the PacificGas rationale, Nevada could reformulate a statute based on eco69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. § 10131 (b) (3).
Id. § 10131 (b) (4).
447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 1152-53.
Id. at 1151.
Id. at 1153,
Id.
461 U.S. 190 (1983).
Cal. Pub. Code § 25524.2 (West 1977).
461 U.S. at 212.
Id.
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nomic concerns. However, Pacific Gas also stated that a moratorium, "even
if enacted out of nonsafety concerns, would nevertheless [infringe upon]
the NRC's exclusive authority"8 0 and would be invalid if did not allow for
the accomplishment of, or frustrated, or even interfered with, a federal
objective. ° This cautious rationale seems to strongly suggest that any
state law whose legislative purpose is to frustrate the development of
nuclear energy would be preempted, even if economic reasons were the
motive behind the state law.
This rationale has been further clarified by English v. General Elec.
Co.,8 2 which involved an employee at a nuclear facility who was dismissed. Alleging that she was dismissed for whistleblowing, the
employee brought a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The issue the Supreme Court examined was whether a state-law tort claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress was preempted by federal
law. The Court ruled that although "these laws could be said to affect tangentially some of the resource allocation decisions that might have a bearing on radiological safety" 83 the state law in question does not directly or
substantially federal law in such a way to warrant preemption.8 4 The
Court also clarified Pacific Gas by ruling that "[while] part of the preempted field is defined by reference to the purpose of the state law in
question, another part
of the field is defined by the state law's actual effect
85
on nuclear safety."
The Watkins decision consistently followed Northern States, Pacific
Gas and English when it found the state's law and its authority prohibiting
a nuclear-waste repository were preempted. The court ruled that Nevada's statute "has the actual effect of frustrating Congress' intent [to characterize Yucca Mountainl." 86
Plan for Action
How can a state's legislative motive avoid being determined as
frustrating the development of nuclear energy? Nevada could accomplish
this by basing its statute on environmental and economic concerns, in
addition to supplementing the federal regulatory scheme. 8 7 Maybe the
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id. at 226.
496 U.S. 72 (1990).
Id. at 81.

84. Id.
85. Id. at 80.
86. Watkins, 914 F.2d at 1561.
87. In Granite Rock, determining that the local permit requirement was not preempted, the

Court examined "whether the state can regulate uses rather than prohibit them. Put another
way, the state is not seeking to determine basic uses of federal land; rather it is seeking to regulate a given mining use so that it is carried out in a more environmentally sensitive an
resource-protective fashion." GraniteRock, 480 U.S. at 587.
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use of existing federal environmental acts, such as NEPA, 88 may serve
Nevada better than the fruitless use of a state veto as an "'obstacle to the
accomplishment to [the characterization of Yucca Mountainl." 89
States may be able to avoid preemption if the state law 1) does not
directly conflict with a federal act; 2) does not hinder the full accomplishment of congressional objectives; or 3) exists in the presence of Congress'
intent to occupy the field of nuclear energy, including waste disposal.
Unfortunately, it appears that the courts are moving toward the total
"occupation of the field of nuclear energy" 90 and Nevada's ability to creatively redraft a statute would be useless. Under this scenario, the federal
government is immune from state regulation of nuclear waste and states
may only be able to voice their concerns about public health and safety as
"a legitimate local public interest.. .91 if the state legislation was authorized by Congress. 92 Currently Nevada is using environmental permits to
regulate the characterization of Yucca Mountain and nuclear-waste disposal.93 Although the constitutionality of these permits has not been challenged yet, Congress 94 or the courts95 may change this.
CONCLUSION
Nevada v. Watkins illustrates the federal government's authority
to enact legislation (the 1987 NWPA amendments) pursuant to the Property Clause in the nuclear-waste management field. With Nevada being
85.1% federally owned,9 6 and Yucca Mountain being a federally owned
property, Nevada has no real authority to regulate the siting of Yucca
Mountain. States should have a significant participatory role in the regulation transportation and storage of nuclear waste within their boundaries
88. Strategically this may pose a problem because NEPA does not apply until after the
characterization of Yucca Mountain.
89. Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp., 601 F.2d 1080,1086 (9th Cir. 1979), aft'd, 445 U.S. 947
(1980) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)) (additional cites omitted).
90. This is evidenced by the courts' examination of extensive regulatory scheme, statutory
language, or legislative history.
91. Pike v. Bruce Church Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
92. In Pacific Gas the Court defined the California law as having a purpose other than those
of the AEC. 461 U.S. at 199. It may be possible for Nevada to have a statute that falls within
that context.
93. Nevada requires DOE to obtain state permits before DOE begins characterization of
Yucca Mountain. E. Eldrige, Nevada SenatorsBlock Energy Bill Over State's Rights Issue, Gannet
News Service, June 23,1992, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
94. W. Dizard, NuclearIssues In ContentionAs House, Senate Talk Out Energy Bill, Nucleonics
Week, Aug. 6, 1992, at 9, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
95. Courts may follow Ventura, and rule that the permits have the actual effect of frustrating the characterization of Yucca Mountain and thus are preempted.
96. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, United States Statistical Abstract 197
tbl. 340 (1990).
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state
because there are significant advantages to doing so.97 Although
98
ownership of repositories would be ideal, it is equally unlikely.
As of yet, Yucca Mountain has not yet been found suitable for a
HLW repository, but Nevada, and states with a large percentage of federal
public land, should be prepared. Probably the most practical action
Nevada could take would be to enter into regional agreements with
nearby states for the disposal of HLW. This would emulate the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Act 99 which authorizes states to enter into
regional compacts for the disposal of low level waste. By entering into
such agreements states could have at least some regulatory authority over
nuclear-waste disposal. 100
If Yucca Mountain is found unsuitable, which state is next?1 0 1
Presently, it appears that Nevada has no other protection but to heavily
regulate the activities at Yucca Mountain through environmental permits.
This conflict over the siting of a nuclear waste repository is necessary to
ensure that we not only have a suitable site for nuclear waste, but because
the future of all humanity hangs in the balance and past mistakes should
not be repeated.
One such mistake happened in Lyons, Kansas. The Atomic
Energy Commission (AEC) first attempted to bury HLW in the Carey salt
mine in 1971. The AEC placed a small number of waste-simulating electrically heated (and some real) waste canisters in holes which were bored in
the salt. The experiment proved that the canisters could be damaged by
the salt. Despite this knowledge, the AEC proceeded to develop a waste
disposal facility at Lyons anyway. The permanent storage of both transuranic waste10 2 and HLW was planned to commence in Kansas. AEC offi97. First, state and local regulation can create programs tailored to local needs with the
ability to adapt more easily and efficiently to changes in local needs. Second, state and local
government's can experiment with a variety of approaches to regulation. Third, there is a
greater accountability and legitimacy that can be provided by state and local regulation. C.
Boyden Gray, Regulation and Federalism,1 Yale J. Reg. 93, 95 (1983).
98. Several states have enacted laws that mandate state ownership of disposal sites. Alabama (Ala. Code § 22-30-7 Supp.1982), Arizona (Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §36-2802 (Supp. 1982),
North Carolina (N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 104E-6.2; 130-166-17A (Supp. 1981), Oregon (Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 459.590 (1981)).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1989).
100. "All of us need to be reminded that the Federal Government did not create the States;
the States created the Federal Government." Inaugural Address of President Ronald Reagan,

17 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2 (Jan. 20,1981).
101. In Watkins the adequacy of the political process to protect Nevada was questioned. A
similar concern about the lack of specified limits on federal power was expressed in Garcia
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 565 n.9. The concerns expressed
by the dissent in Garciafocused on the government's potential abuse of power via Commerce
Clause and any federal power that did not have specified limits. Id. at 560 (Powell, J., dissenting).
102. Transuranicwaste is "material contaminated with elements that have an atomic num"42 U.S.C. § 2014 (1993).
ber greater than 92 ....
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cials boasted of the site's suitability being, "equal or superior to the others

[in the countryl." 10 3

Contrary to AEC's determination of the suitability of the site, the
Kansas Geological Survey and other independent geologist found that the
site was, indeed, unsafe.10 4 Further evidence of the unsuitability of the site
became apparent, when these geologist found out that a nearby solution
mining operation "lost" 180,000 gallons of water at the site. Dr. William
Hambleton of the Kansas Geological Survey described the site as "a bit
like a piece of Swiss cheese." 10 5 In 1973, after seventeen years of study,
millions of dollars spent on research and various recommendations that
contradicted AEC announcements, the AEC abandoned the site.
There are several steps that can be taken to develop an safe and
acceptable waste disposal plan. 106 First, limit the generation of nuclear
waste, this will enable us to determine how many repositories are needed.
Second, technical standards should be created through a public process
which can determine whether sites are suitable. Third, scientists should be
in charge of the program and should not be overly constrained by funding
and time schedules. Last, outside independent experts and the public
should have oversight of the nuclear waste program. Although not foolproof, these steps provide a path toward solving the nuclear waste problem.
WILLIAM MABRY III

103. Lipschutz, supra note 7, at 119.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 120.
106. Interview with Don Hancock, Director of the Southwest Research and Information
Center, in Albuquerque, NM (July 17, 1991).

